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CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY, EXECUTIVES' PET CHARITIES
AND THE AGENCY PROBLEM
JAYNE

W. BARNARD.

Historically, charitable contributions often depended on the
personal interests of the chief executive officer. Today the
corporate culture is being redefined. 1
Once considered the whim of CEOs-or of their
spouses-corporate giving these days is often a standard business
expense for which results must be shown. 2
In [the 1950s], the chief executive officer played an exaggerated
role. He might identify a pet cause, one that had little or no
connection to the core activities of the business, and proceed to
commit the corporation to donating relatively large sums of
money . . . . [Today], a [new] stage in corporate giving has
emerged. This stage has been labelled strategic philanthropy.
Strategic philanthropy attempts to link charitable giving to
financial performance. 3
I. INTRODUCTION

Corporate philanthropy in the mid-1990s is said to be governed by
strict criteria, implemented by professionals who demand accountability
from the donees, and evaluated in terms of stated corporate objectives. It
is strategic, cost-conscious, and "'Janus-faced'-one face serving the

* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary School of Law.
Some of the thoughts in this paper originated in my Seminar in Corporate Governance.
I am grateful to my students for discussing the issues surrounding corporate philanthropy
with me. Thanks also to Glenn Coven, Toni Robinson, and Steve Bainbridge, who read
earlier drafts of this commentary and whose comments and insights helped to make it
more coherent. Lawrence Lederman and Alemante Selassie also made good suggestions.
Most of all, thanks to Faith Kahn and the editors and members of the New York Law
School Law Review for putting together this exciting symposium on a complex and
interesting subject.
1. DIANE J. GINGOLD & ELIZABETH A.C. WElL, THE CORPORATE PATRON 13
(1991).

2. P.J. Corkery, What's in It for Me? Self-interest Is Guiding the Corporate
Handouts of Today-Leaving Some Worthy Causes Out in the Cold, Bus. MONTHLY,
Nov. 1, 1989, at 46, 47.

3. MOSES L. PAVA & JOSHUA KRAUSZ, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL COST 115-16 (1995).
1147

1148

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

community, the other serving [the corporation's] business units. " 4 The
whims or "pet projects" of highly-placed executives no longer drive
corporate charitable contributions as they once did. 5
This scenario, though perhaps appealing, is a myth in many public
companies. As has been the case throughout American history, corporate
philanthropy today is often driven by the personal preferences of highlyplaced executives. Executives' "pet projects" have not disappeared. To
the contrary, subsidized "pet projects" are thriving in the arts, in
education, in the environment, and in various programs for the indigent.
This commentary examines the phenomenon of "pet charity" funding
by public companies. Without questioning that the corporate giving
function in many corporations has become institutionalized in the last
fifteen years, complete with grant-giving guidelines, standardized
application procedures, glossy public reports of corporate giving and
sophisticated "cause-related marketing" strategies, this commentary
challenges the notion that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) no longer
influence corporate giving in significant and sometimes very personal
ways.
Indeed, this commentary will explore several recent situations in which
a corporation's CEO allocated corporate funds toward charitable activities
that may fairly be placed in the "pet charity" category or at the very least
cannot reasonably be assigned to the category of strategic philanthropy.
There are many examples of such behavior, some of them captured in
4. Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June
1994, at 105, 108.
5. The significance of the terms "pet project" and "pet charity" derives from the
leading case addressing the propriety of corporate charitable contributions, A. P. Smith
Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved a corporate contribution to Princeton University where there was "no suggestion that it was made indiscriminately or to a
pet charity of the corporate directors in furtherance of personal rather than corporate
ends." !d. at 590. Accordingly, the contribution was found to be valid under both
common and statutory law. See id.
One might question the conclusion that there was no "pet charity" involved in the
Barlow case considering that the then-president of A.P. Smith, Hubert F. O'Brien, was
an alumnus of Princeton, class of 1931. Telephone Interview with Mary Terrell,
Princeton Alumni Council (Sept. 9, 1996). Regardless, the suggestion that gifts to "pet
charities" might be inappropriate was challenged in a later decision:
And while the court [in Barlow] pointed out that there was no showing that the
gift in question was made indiscriminately or to a pet charity ... , the actual
holding of the opinion appears to be that a corporate charitable or educational
gift to be valid must merely be within reasonable limits both as to amount and
purpose.
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969).
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best-selling business books, journalistic exposes, and even some judicial
opinions.
These examples serve as a reminder that corporate CEOs have often
used their corporations' resources as if those resources were their own,
and sometimes for very rational reasons. These CEOs have spent their
shareholders' money on projects that offered little, if any, benefit to the
corporation while providing substantial benefits to the CEOs in the form
of psychic satisfaction, increased status, and visibility in the community
of leaders in which they travel or to which they aspire. 6 Occasionally,
these executives have "matched" their corporate contributions with
personal contributions; more often, however, they have not, finding the
use of their corporation's resources to be an adequate expression of their
charitable intent.7
This behavior, which in other contexts might amount to
misappropriation, has long been thought to be acceptable, primarily
because the benefitted charities have been "qualified" and are therefore
worthy to receive corporate gifts, and because the gifts themselves have
typically been immaterial, in an accounting sense, to the corporation. 8
Little critical attention has been paid to this behavior, probably because
progressives have viewed corporate philanthropy as desirable, regardless
of its origins, and managerialists have viewed corporate philanthropy as
a legitimate perquisite of leadership.
6. See generally infra Section IV. There are several reasons why a CEO may choose
to orchestrate corporate charitable contributions: to enhance her personal prestige in her
local community; to elevate her reputation as one who can make things happen; to reciprocate for earlier contributions made by business colleagues to other projects with
which she is associated; or simply because, within her own belief system, a particular
organization is a good, socially valuable organization to support.
7. Warren Buffett tells the story of an acquaintance who solicits funds from corporate
leaders:
[l]t's rather interesting, in the last five years he's raised 8 million dollars. He's
raised it from 60 corporations. It almost never fails .... And in the process
of raising this 8 million dollars from 60 corporations from people who nod and
say that it's a marvelous idea, its pro-social, etc., not one CEO has reached in
his pocket and pulled out 10 bucks of his own to give to this marvelous charity.
They've given 8 million dollars collectively of other people's money. And so
far he's yet to get his first 10-dollar bill.
JOHN COFFEE ET AL., KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE
TAKEOVER 14 (1988).

8. See Usha C.V. Haley, Corporate Contributions as Managerial Masques:
Reframing Corporate Contributions as Strategies to Influence Society, 28 J. MGMT.
STUD. 486, 503 (1991) ("[m]anagerial discretion over contributions may exist because
contributions form such small percentages of corporate incomes.").
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There are several ways, however, to approach those giving situations
in which conflicts of interest are apparent: (1) one could ignore them on
the theory that other corporate governance issues of arguably greater
magnitude are more deserving of attention and legal reform; (2) one could
prohibit these situations from occurring either by completely outlawing
corporate charitable contributions or by outlawing corporate charitable
contributions with a conflict of interest "profile"; (3) one could treat these
contributions as taxable income to the CEO or disallow the corporation's
deductions for such contributions; (4) one could, as Professor Kahn
suggests, 9 require that these and all charitable expenditures be disclosed
under the federal securities laws; and (5) one could insist that such
expenditures regularly be considered by the board of directors as part of
an overall package that takes into account both executive compensation
practices and corporate charitable objectives.
In this commentary, I will explore and reject the first three
approaches, endorse a version of the fourth and argue in favor of the fifth.
Before doing so, however, I will recapitulate the history of CEO
involvement in corporate charitable contributions and examine some of the
more notorious examples of CEOs who have commandeered the corporate
charitable function. I will also examine some of the reasons why CEOs
find corporate philanthropy such an alluring arena in which to exercise
their power.
II. THE FivE STAGES OF MODERN CORPORATE GIVING
AND THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

A. From Unilateral Decisions to Complex Organization
From 1935, when Congress first granted a tax deduction for corporate
charitable contributions, 10 until the mid-1970s, most corporate philanthropy
was modest, informal, idiosyncratic, and characterized largely by localized
expenditures. 11
Charitable allocations were typically driven by a
company's chief executive officer, who unilaterally determined the objects
of his corporation's philanthropic efforts, the amount to be devoted to
9. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the
Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REv. 579, 586 (1997).
10. See Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014 (adding subsection
(r) to section 23 of the Revenue Act of 1934, thereby allowing a corporation to deduct
charitable contributions to the extent of five percent of its income).
11. See generally ERNEST W. LEFEVER ET AL., SCHOLARS, DOLLARS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 14-15 (1983); Peter Dobkin Hall, Business Giving and Social Investment in the
United States, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 221-45
(Richard Magat ed., 1989).
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particular projects, and the manner (if at all) in which the gifts would be
monitored. 12 A corporation's charitable activity was often a measure of
the CEO's power in his company as well as his status in the community.
Thus, in stage one, or the "benevolent despot" stage of corporate
philanthropy, the chief executive officer was unquestionably the key to
corporate giving; little, if any, attention was given to the profit
expectations or giving preferences of shareholders.
A significant transformation in corporate philanthropy occurred during
the Watergate era:
Prior to [this period], many managers had adhered to a philosophy
that stressed "sticking to business" and avoiding the media, but
during the 1970s a managerial culture emerged that, by contrast,
emphasized outreach and openness. Fearing increasing political
isolation in a period of public disenchantment with established
institutions, major corporations enlarged their public affairs
operations, by opening Washington offices, creating political
action committees, encouraging their managers to participate in
community affairs and, not least, expanding their giving
budgets. 13
During this second, or "public citizen," stage of corporate
philanthropy, decisions relating to charitable giving continued to reside in
the highest precincts of the corporation and typically reflected the social
and political values of the CEO. Some corporate leaders, like William C.
Norris of Control Data Corporation, committed their companies to very
ambitious visions of social change, often to the dismay of their
subordinates. 14 Other CEOs were less visible, though many inched their
12. An example of this type of CEO-driven philanthropy is David Rockefeller's
creation at the Chase Manhattan Bank of a "corporate art" program in the late 1950s.
Rockefeller, whose family had founded the Museum of Modern Art in New York City,
put together a program by which Chase would purchase paintings, display them at bank
offices around the world, then donate them (claiming appreciated valuations) to various
art museums. See WILLIAM HOFFMAN, DAVID 84 (1971).
13. Michael Useem, Corporate Support for Culture and the Arts, in THE COST OF
CULTURE: PATTERNS AND PROSPECTS OF PRIVATE ARTS PATRONAGE 45, 45 (Margaret
Jane Wyzomirski & Pat Clubb eds., 1989) [hereinafter Useem, Corporate Support].
14. See JAMES C. WORTHY, WILLIAM C. NORRIS: PORTRAIT OF A MAVERICK
(1987). Under Norris's direction, Control Data became a national leader in siting
factories in urban ghettoes. Moreover, at Norris's insistence, these plants were staffed
largely by the so-called "hard-core unemployed" who lived in nearby neighborhoods.
With force of will and painstaking management, these factories became efficient and,
ultimately, successful. Norris became a critic of traditional corporate philanthropy,
noting:
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companies towards a more socially responsible profile. 15 "In most cases,
these gestures were responses to public demand or expressions of wellintentioned executives[' desire] to 'do good.'" 16 In either case, the
selection of a charitable agenda was typically dominated by the corporate
chief executive or other high-level corporate officers. 17 As in the
"benevolent despot" stage of corporate philanthropy, little thought was
given to the profit expectations or the charitable preferences of
shareholders. 18
l
Then came the third, or "technocratic," stage of corporate
philanthropy, characterized by the professionalization of the giving
process. Rather than distributing corporate charitable ftifts from the
executive suite or "out of the back pocket of the CEO," 9 corporations
began designating professional gift managers to establish gift criteria and
priorities, provide order and consistency in recordkeeping, develop
ongoing ties with charitable recipients and report on the impact of the
corporation's philanthropic program. As one observ:er noted in 1981,

"You look at the reports (of corporate and other foundations] and, hell, there
are hundreds of little projects, $10,000 here and $5,000 there, and what have
they got to show for it? You can see, they're really not accomplishing very
much." Philanthropy [like this] "makes the boss feel like a white knight for
a little while," [but these kinds of projects are] "peripheral to real problems .
"
!d. at 132.
15. For example, following the Detroit riots of 1967, and at the request of the mayor
and the governor, Henry Ford II announced the creation of 6,500 new jobs, five thousand
of which would be filled by ghetto residents. "Written job tests were dispensed with, and
special buses were put into service to ferry the new labor force to the plants." WALTER
HAYES, HENRY: A LIFE OF HENRY FORD II 52 (1990).
16. Hall, supra note 11, at 237.
17. In a study conducted from 1980 to 1981 of 229 large companies, researchers
found that the primary policy setter for corporate contributions was either a committee
of senior executives (27.5% of respondents) or the CEO (22.7% of respondents). See
John J. Siegfried et al., The Management of Corporate Contributions, in 5 REsEARCH IN
CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY: A REsEARCH ANNUAL 87, 92 (Lee E.
Preston ed., 1983). Other sources of policy setting included the board of directors
(17.9% of respondents) and the chairman of the board (10.9%). See id.
18. It is fair to say that the rhetoric accompanying many of these charitable projects
suggested otherwise. Decisions to open factories in urban ghettos, for example, were
often justified by the need to "create new markets."
19. Siegfried et al., supra note 17, at 97 (describing the method that some companies
in his study used to determine to whom corporate charitable contributions would be
made).
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Giving . . . is now seen by most corporations as a matter of
corporate policy, requiring a rational and systematic process of
review by someone held responsible and accountable for the
action taken. Many corporations now have highly qualified
managers to administer contributions . . . a situation that differs
vastly from that existing at the beginning of the [1970s]. 20
During this stage, corporations began to be seen as moving toward a
"more market-driven strategic management, bottom-line approach to
philanthropy. " 21 Even during this third stage, however, corporate
charitable giving was often more reactive than proactive.22 Corporations
for the most part still responded to grant requests from unrelated nonprofit
organizations, rather than shaping a process that uniquely identified a
corporate philanthropic agenda.
Throughout this period, a growing number of corporations established
separate charitable foundations through which to channel their giving.
These foundations permitted a company to even out the "peaks and
valleys" in contributions resulting from swings in corporate profits,23 and
allowed a corporation to maximize the impact of corporate gifts.24 A few
foundations were specifically designed to insulate the giving process from
the influences of the CE0. 25 Studies show, however, that "[w]ith very
few exceptions, foundation boards [were] composed entirely of company
officers and management, and for practical purposes, there was no
distinction between the giving programs of the corporations themselves and
20. 2 AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR THE ARTS, CORPORATE GIVING IN THE ARTS 3
(Robert A. Porter ed., 1981).
21. Timothy S. Mescon & Donn J. Tilson, Corporate Philanthropy: A Strategic
Approach to the Bottom-Line, 29 CAL. MGMT. REv. 49, 49 (1987).
22. See E.B. Knauft, The Management of Corporate Giving Programs, in
PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS 261, 265 (Richard Magat
ed., 1989).
23. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS IN SMALLER
COMPANIES 4 (1973) (describing how companies utilize this mechanism).
24. See Benjamin T. White, Consequences of Corporate Giving, TR. & EsT., Aug.
1987, at 35, 35 ("The immediate deductibility of gifts to the foundation means that in
good years a corporation can 'endow' its foundation, and, as the earnings of that
endowment build up, use those earnings to supplement the grants made possible by the
company's annual contribution to the foundation."); see also CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER,
FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 185 (1985) ("Contributions from a
corporation to its foundation are deductible like other contributions and are subject to the
percentage ceiling, but grants made by foundations are not subject to the ceiling.").
25. See Siegfried et al., supra note 17, at 92 (stating that "19 firms [out of 229]
reported that a major purpose of their corporate foundation is to foster autonomous
decisions in allocating contributions").
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the giving programs of corporate foundations. "26 Consequently, as in the
first and second stages of modern corporate philanthropy, corporate top
executives maintained tight control over their companies' charitable giving
programs. Shareholders' economic concerns were largely disregarded. 27
The fourth, or "decade of greed," stage of corporate giving emerged
in the mid-1980s, as corporations began to conflate philanthropy with their
marketing strategies. Increasingly, corporate giving was calculated to
promote a particular corporate image, or to stimulate sales. By 1991, for
example, "[t]he funds raised by the National Gallery's office of corporate
relations . . . most often [came] from marketing, public relations, and
advertising budgets, not corporate foundations. "28
"Cause-related
marketing," conceived by American Express in 1983 when it (very
publicly) promised to make a penny contribution to the Statue of Liberty
restoration effort for every use of an American Express credit card, was
embraced by many other American companies to the point that, for some,
the marketing of the giving campaign to the public cost man1 times the
amount actually given as a corporate charitable contribution. 2 By 1990,
the use of cause-related marketin~ techniques was increasing by between
ten and fifteen percent annually. 3
26. Knauft, supra note 22, at 266.
27. Shareholders' social concerns, on the other hand, became a preoccupying issue
for many companies. The 1970s saw a dramatic rise in the submission of shareholder
social proposals and labor and church organizations began orchestrating high-visibility
proxy campaigns. See, e.g., Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest:
Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1971) (describing this grass-roots
effort).
28. GINGOLD & WElL, supra note 1, at 13.
29. For example, the Coors Brewing Company's "Literacy, Pass it On" program
has been described as a $40 million effort. Of that amount, only a small percent
represents a direct contribution to national, regional and local literacy organizations
providing direct client services. The balance has been spent on an "extensive public
awareness effort. The multimedia component of the program entails newspaper,
magazine, radio and billboard advertising, as well as direct marketing to promote
solutions to illiteracy. Other program components include advertising and public relations
programs targeted to the general market, African-Americans, Hispanics, and women."
L. LAWRENCE EMBLEY, DOING WELL WHILE DOING GOOD: THE MARKETING LINK
BETWEEN BUSINESS AND NONPROFIT CAUSES 178 (1993).
In American Express's case, the company ultimately made a $1.7 million
contribution to the Statue of Liberty Foundation. The number of new cardholders
increased 45 percent during the promotion period and American Express also noted higher
than usual card usage. This, said a spokesman, proved that "helping others also can be
good business." Useem, Corporate Support,. supra note 13, at 50.
30. See Corporate Giving: Who Spends Most, andfor What?, ACROSS THE BOARD,
May 1990, at 30, 33.
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During this period, it became more common for corporate gift
managers to factor in the publicity value of a given gift, along with the
merits of the beneficiary's request, when assessing whether to make a
charitable contribution. 31
Non-profits aggressively cultivated this
mentality32 and many mutually beneficial projects resulted. 33 Corporations
themselves sought out projects that offered a quid pro quo. 34 In short, by
stage four, corporate giving had become "more than a passive product of
business success. It [was now] used to stimulate income as well. " 35
For the first time in history, the economic concerns of shareholders
appeared to be playing a significant role in corporations' philanthropic
decision-making. In the crassest possible way, notions of profit
maximization had at last begun to make their way into the philanthropic
equation. Significantly, many of the gifts that resulted were characterized
for tax purposes as "ordinary and necessary business expenses" rather than
31. See Michael Useem, Trends and Preferences in Corporate Support for the Arts,
in 4 AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR THE ARTS, CORPORATE GIVING IN THE ARTS ix, xiii
(Robert A. Porter ed., 1987) (reporting that surveyed companies increased the attention
given to a gift's "publicity value" between a survey conducted in 1979 and a second
survey conducted in 1986) [hereinafter Useem, Trends].
32. New York's Metropolitan Museum, for example, circulated a prospectus to
business leaders trumpeting the rewards of sponsoring an art exhibition: "Many public
relations opportunities are available through sponsorship of outstanding special exhibitions
at the [Met] .... Learn how you can provide creative and cost effective answers to your
marketing objectives by identifying your corporate names with Vincent Van Gogh ...
Canaletto . . . Remington, Fragonard, Rembrandt or Goya . . . . " NICHOLAS VON
HOFFMAN, CAPITALIST FOOLS: TALES OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, FROM CARNEGIE TO
FORBES TO THE MILKEN GANG 166 (1992).
33. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, The Metropolitan's Notori-ous Display, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 5, 1993, at 64 (describing a costume show at the Metropolitan Museum, sponsored
by a lingerie designer. "For less than the cost of staging a runway fashion show, Natori
links up with a high-profile exhibition of 80 mannequins dressed in designs by the likes
of Valentino, Balenciaga, Fortuny, and Gaultier-as well as four of her own. The Met
predicts that 250,000 visitors will see the show before it closes on Aug. 15. "); What's
in a Name? Art and Food, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at C2 (describing how the
Metropolitan Museum "wooed" Goya Foods Inc., a manufacturer of Hispanic foods, and
secured funding for the museum's elaborate exhibition of 300 works by Francisco de
Goya).
34. See Pamela Sebastian, Attaching Strings: With Coffers Less Full, Big
Companies Alter Their Gifts to Charities, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 26, 1993, at AI
(describing a program by Chrysler Corporation to make donations to popular museums
that would agree to exhibit their new model cars).
35. Useem, Corporate Support, supra note 13, at 48.
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"charitable gifts. "36 These expenditures-often substantial ones-thus
began disappearing from statistics measuring corporate charitable
contributions. "Real" corporate philanthropy began to decline. 37
Today, corporate philanthropy has entered the fifth, or "strategic
retrenchment," stage. In-kind gifts and release time programs for
corporate employees38 have been increasing. 39 Furthermore, the overall
value of corporate giving, exclusive of cause-related marketing efforts,
increased in 1995 to over seven billion dollars. 40
The format of today's corporate giving is quite different than it was
during earlier stages of corporate philanthropy. Corporate giving in 1996
no longer reflects an undisciplined, "smorgasbord" approach to charitable
contributions; rather, it reflects a more selective, long-term investmenttype approach to non-profit organizations.41 "Community partnerships"
are being developed42 and collaborative alliances are being formed between
corporations and their favored charities, or corporations and governmental
36. Payments made by a corporation to a non-profit organization may be treated as
an ordinary and necessary business expense when the company has an expectation of .
financial return from the gift. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-09-006 (Mar. 5, 1993) (supermarket's ·
donation of one percent of its revenue to local charities, following an extensive
advertising campaign in which the charities' names were prominently featured, may be
treated as a business expense rather than a charitable gift). See also Rev. Rul. 72-314,
1972-1 C.B. 44; Rev. Rul. 63-73, 1963-1 C.B. 35; Robert E. Harrison, Payments to
Charities by Business Enterprises: Sec. 162 v. Sec. 170, TAX ADVISOR, Aug. 1995, at
473.
37. See AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 1995: THE ANNUAL
REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1994, at 76 (1995) (noting that corporate
giving in inflation-adjusted dollars fell each year from 1987 to 1994).
38. See Marcia Vickers, Keeping Valued Employees by Letting Them Go, for a
While, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at Fll (describing such programs).
39. See Paul Sweeney, Corporate Giving Goes Creative, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1994, § 3 (Business), at 6.
40. See William H. Miller, Citizenship That's Hard to Ignore, INDUSTRY WK., Sept.
2, 1996, at 21.
41. See Lois Therrien, Corporate Generosity is Greatly Depreciated, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 2, 1992, at 118.
42. A community partnership is a close relationship between a company
and a not-for-profit institution, in which the company agrees to
contribute human and financial resources to the development of the
institution on terms acceptable to both, so that the institution can
produce better results for society. In return, the institution might
agree to work with the company to enhance its public image or to
cooperate with the marketing of its products in ways which will not
compromise the integrity of either the company or the institution.
Everald Compton, Community Partnerships, 48 IPA REv. 42, 42 (1996).
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agencies, and they are working together toward achievable ends. 43
Corporate giving is also decentralizing, with increasing sums following
markets overseas. 44
Interestingly, executives in this new environment often speak as if
cause-related marketing and residual "true philanthropy" involved similar
profit-maximizing objectives: one philanthropic executive insists, "[i]f
we're perceived as people who just give away shareholders' money, we're
not going to last very long. " 45 Another adds, "[i]t's shareholder equity
we're spending here. You can't have a function like this without looking
at the return to the shareholder . . . . " 46 While these statements may be
disingenuous, they do reflect a continuing sensitivity to the lessons of the
1980s. Namely, investors may be willing to tolerate some corporate
philanthropy, but they are not likely to support companies' profligacy at
their expense.
B. The Recurring Motif of the Chief Executive Officer
Throughout the five stages of corporate philanthropic activity, the
chief executive officer has always played an important role. At a
minimum, the CEO has consistently been seen as providing guidance or
"setting the tone" for corporate giving. Most observers believe that
companies whose CEOs place a high value on charitable giving typically
give more generously than companies whose CEOs do not. Indeed, a
1989 study reported that, "other factors being equal, the percentage of pretax net income allocated to contributions by firms with highly committed
chief executives was double that of firms whose CEO's commitment was
low." 47
Still another study, one of 672 corporations based in
Massachusetts, reveals that companies whose chief executives
were more vigorously involved in the contributions effort
43. "Instead of scattering their resources piecemeal, companies are involving all their
business units around a project and building relationships." Sweeney, supra note 39.
44. See Stan Crock, When Charity Doesn't Begin at Home, Bus. WK., Nov. 27,
1995, at 6.
45. Therrien, supra note 41, at 118 (quoting Eugene R. Wilson, president of the
Arco Foundation).
46. Molly McKaughan, Is Corporate Philanthropy Drying Up?, ACROSS THE BOARD,
Apr. 1995, at 21, 22 (quoting Caroline 0. Boitano, president and executive director of
the BankAmerica Foundation).
47. Useem, Corporate Support, supra note 13, at 52.

1158

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

experienced higher growth rates in their [philanthropic] budgets
than did other finns. 48
These studies, like most studies of business giving, unfortunately
included both public and closely-held companies. Therefore, they are of
limited value in evaluating the influence over charitable giving of public
company CEOs. At least one recent study, however, focused exclusively
on public companies and found a significant relationship between the
CEO's personal level of "community orientation" and his company's level
of charitable giving. 49 In many companies today, public companies
included, CEOs retain sole authority to detennine the amount of corporate
funds that will be allocated to charitable activities.50
Moreover, a CEO's involvement in corporate philanthropy does not
end at setting the budget. According to a 1982 study, "enterprises with
a chief executive who backed more spending on the arts were more than
twice as likely as other companies to have enlarged the proportion of their
gifts budget allocated to culture. " 51 Another, more recent, survey
confinned the influence of top-level executives, especially when it came
to allocating funds to arts organizations.52 In a study conducted in 1988,
48. /d. (citing John Bartolomeo, The Attitudes and Motivations of Chief Executive
Officers, in CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY: PHILOSOPHY, MANAGEMENT, TRENDS,
FUTURE, BACKGROUND (Council on Foundations ed., 1982)).
49. See Linda D. Lerner & Gerald E. Fryxell, CEO Stakeholder Attitudes and
Corporate Social Activity in the Fortune 500, 33 Bus. & Soc. 58 (1994). Another study
found that a public company whose CEO is well-entrenched and has been with the
company for a long time is more likely to have a strong corporate social responsibility
profile than a company whose CEO is a newcomer. See Anisya S. Thomas & Roy L.
Simerly, The Chief Executive Officer and Corporate Social Performance: An
Interdisciplinary Examination, 13 J. Bus. ETHICS 959, 965 (1994).
50. See The Conference Board, Corporate Giving Strategies That Add Business
Value, CONF. BoARD REs., 1995 (No. 11 26-95-RR) at 15 (reporting that 14.3% of the
463 companies surveyed entrusted this decision solely to the CEO; 14.9% of the
companies entrusted the decision to a management committee; 14.7% entrusted the
decision to a contributions committee; 14.5% made the decision using a formula based
on pre-tax net income; 6.7% based the decision on a strategic plan; and 21.4% made the
decision based on some combination of the above).
51. Useem, Corporate Support, supra note 13, at 52 (citing John Bartolomeo, The
Attitudes and Motivations of Chief Executive Officers, in CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY:
PHILOSOPHY, MANAGEMENT, TRENDS, FUTURE, BACKGROUND {Council on Foundations
ed., 1982)).
52. See William Grimes, Business Said to Put More In Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1995, at CIS ("In 1991, 82 percent of businesses reported that the chairman, chief
executive officer or partner made decisions about charitable giving. In 1994, that figure
dropped to 76 percent.").
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two out of three CEOs described themselves as "the major influence on
their companies' corporate giving policy. "53
These studies are of limited value because of the indiscriminate mixing
of both public and closely-held companies and because of the limitations
of self-reporting. However, they lend support to the proposition that
corporate chief executives today, as in the past, are often deeply involved
in decisions about which organizations will receive charitable
contributions. 54 Certainly, these CEOs devote a substantial amount of
their time to the corporate giving enterprise.55
Consider two recent examples of public company CEOs whose role in
corporate philanthropy is both apparent and pervasive. A 1996 Economist
profile of John Bryan, the CEO of Sara Lee, notes that Bryan often
conducts himself "as if Sara Lee were still a family firm and he [was] still
its owner. " 56
His own convictions [about, for instance, racial diversity] and
interests [in, for example, fine art] permeate the company. Sara
Lee owns a fine collection of impressionist paintings. It gives
away about 2% of its pre-tax profits, at the upper end of what is
common for big American companies. Under Mr. Bryan's
influence this goes mainly to disadvantaged groups and cultural
institutions.[] Another Bryan hobby-horse is the advancement of
women in business.57
53. COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS, THE CLIMATE FOR CORPORATE GIVING: CURRENT
AND FUTURE CEOS TALK ABOUT GIVING IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT 12 (1988). The
size of the company may be important in determining just what role the CEO will play
in philanthropic decision-making: "The CEO plays a key role in determining the level
of giving. The larger the company, the less the CEO is involved in decisions about
individual grants." /d.
54. A study of public companies only, conducted from 1981 to 1985, noted that in
response to the question "why do you believe that your company gives money to
charitable organizations," 13.5% of the respondents answered that their companies did
so to enable top level executives to support their favorite charities and 5.8% indicated that
their companies' charitable contributions reflected the religious commitment of the CEO.
See JOSEPH GALASKIEWICZ, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF AN URBAN GRANTS ECONOMY:
A STUDY OF BUSINESS PHILANTHROPY AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 90 (1985).
55. In a 1988 survey of 255 chief executive officers, 71% of the respondents
characterized themselves as '"highly involved' in corporate giving activities; indeed, the
CEOs •.. report[ed that], on average, [they] spendO four hours per week on corporate
giving activities both during and after business hours." COUNCIL ON FouNDATIONS,
supra note 53, at 6.
56. The Cecil Rhodes of Chocolate-Chip Cookies, ECONOMIST, May 25, 1996, at
74.
57. ld.
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Nation's Business recently profiled Edwin Lupberger, chairman and
president of Entergy Corporation, one of the world's largest investorowned electric utilities, with more than $22.5 billion in. assets. 58
Lupberger' s achievements include the creation of an ambitious region-wide
literacy program and "implementing the first so-called Fair Share
agreement between an electric utility holding company and the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. " 59 Mr. Lupberger
is an active fund-raiser for the NAACP. 60
It is not that these mens' philanthropies are inappropriate for their
companies, or suboptimal (although they may be). The point is merely
that, in many public companies today-including some very successful
ones-the chief executive officer remains the driving force behind
significant charitable decisions. To believe that CEOs' preferences have
disappeared from the philanthropic mix is to underestimate both the power
of many of today's CEOs and the importance that corporate philanthropy
may play in their professional lives. These CEOs often fashion their selfimage in part on what they are able to accomplish philanthropically.
To summarize, though the tradition of CEO micromanagement of
corporate giving has surely waned in recent years, especially as
"checkbook philanthropy" has declined, CEO influence over the specifics
of corporate giving is very much alive and well. Today, as in the earlier
stages of corporate philanthropy, the CEO's personal values and priorities
often shape the giving practices in many public companies.
III.

WHEN CORPORATE CHARITABLE GIVING REPRESENTS AN
ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE POWER

While a CEO's influence on corporate philanthropy may be benign,
socially productive, and in some cases even profit-maximizing, that
influence may also be quite inappropriate and ultimately a sign of peril to
the corporation. Consider some recent examples of what one might call
"idiosyncratic corporate giving" but what more appropriately should be
described as "opportunistic corporate giving." None of these examples
can reasonably be said to represent an attempt at profit-maximizing
philanthropy. Furthermore, most of the examples to follow in this section
cannot even be said to have advanced the corporation's public image.
One such example is Charles Keating, CEO of Lincoln Savings, whose
religious lay leadership often formed the basis for his company's charitable
giving: using corporate funds, he generously supported India's Mother
58. See Albert G. Holzinger, A Businessman on a Mission, NATION's Bus., May
1996, at 66.

59. ld. at 68.
60. See id.
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Theresa, the Reverend Bruce Ritter of Covenant House and other Catholic
charities around the world. 61 He often loaned Mother Theresa use of his
corporate jet or helicopter and loaned tens of millions of dollars to Father
Bruce to renovate homeless shelters in New York City. 62 In 1983, Keating
announced that his company would give $100,000 a year for ten years to
the St. Vincent de Paul Society.63 "In two years, 1984 to 1986, Keating's
corporations [contributed a total of] $6 million to charity. " 64 Keating and
his wife, on the other hand, reported almost no charitable contributions on
their personal tax returns. 6
Lincoln Savings was ultimately (and
notoriously) declared insolvent.
The use of corporate funds to advance a CEO's pet charities has not
been limited to the thrift industry, however, or to executives who later
turned out to be felons. One of the most calculating uses of corporate
philanthropy was found in the tobacco industry, where Ross Johnson, then
CEO of RJR Nabisco, used a number of techniques to cosset his board of
directors and ensure their personal loyalty to him. "'One of the most
important jobs a CEO has is the care and feeding of the directors,'
Johnson said. " 66 To this end, Johnson had RJR Nabisco endow academic
chairs in his directors' names at the universities of their choice.67 When
he needed a critical vote from Paul Sticht, a former RJR executive serving
on the company's board, Johnson offered Sticht a generous consulting
contract and also arranged a $6 million donation from RJR to the J. Paul
Sticht Center on Aging at the Bowman Gray School ofMedicine. 68 "Sticht
soon came around," observers note. 69
At one point, Johnson arranged for the RJR Nabisco Foundation to
make a "fat donation" to a small Florida college where one of his
directors' wives was a trustee. 70 In return, both Johnson and his wife
received honorary degrees.71 Johnson often insisted that "Team Nabisco,"
a group of retired sports heroes who played in charity golf tournaments
61. See MICHAEL BINSTEIN & CHARLES BOWDEN, TRUST ME: CHARLES KEATING
AND THE MISSING BILLIONS 49 {1993).

62. See id.
63. See id. at 167.
64. ld. at 49.
65. See id. at 13.
66. See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE
FALL OF RJR NABISCO 26 {1990).
67. See id. at 97.
68. See id. at 82.
69. ld.
70. See id. at 83.
71. See id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

1162

[Vol. 41

around the country under the sponsorship of RJR, include the directors in
their games. 72 Not surprisingly, when Johnson ultimately launched a
leveraged buyout for the company in 1988, many of these directors
supported Johnson in the face of national outrage at the gluttonous terms
Johnson had crafted for himself. Johnson ultimately lost in the
competition to take over RJR Nabisco, but not before becoming the virtual
poster child for corporate greed.
The entertainment industry, too, has seen examples of opportunistic
corporate giving. The legendary Steve Ross, CEO of Time-Warner, Inc.
until his death in 1992, was widely known for both his personal and his
corporate generosity. He often took business associates on shopping
sprees, acquiring expensive pieces of jewe1~. 73 Business gifts valued at
$50,000 or $100,000 were not uncommon. 4 Because of Ross's wife's
interest in the Dallas Museum, Warner Communications (the predecessor
to Time-Warner) made a million-dollar contribution to that museum; 75 the
company, under Mrs. Ross's guidance, also purchased millions of dollars
worth of "'corporate art. "76
Ross sometimes whipped out a company checkbook to make
substantial corporate contributions, never consulting with a committee. 77
Under Ross's direction, Warner Communications lavishly supported the
pet charities of its directors78 and sometimes made six-figure gifts in their
honor. 79 As in the case of RJR's Ross Johnson, Steve Ross's behavior
gave rise to a remarkably sugine board of directors which often failed to
rein in the CEO's excesses. 8
The heavy industry sector has also seen its share of opportunistic
corporate giving: The since-deposed CEO of Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
72. See id. at 26.
73. See CONNIE BRUCK, MAsTER OF THE GAME: STEVE ROSS AND THE CREATION
OF TIME WARNER 103 (1994).
74. See
75. See
76. See
77. See

id.
id.
id.
id.

at 204.
at 212.
at 168.
at 212 (recounting a $250,000 corporate check written to a California
museum representative during a casual meeting in Ross's hotel room).
78. See id. at 223 (detailing gifts to the New York City Opera Company at the
request of board member Beverly Sitts).
79. See id. at 232 (noting a $500,000 gift in honor of board member Mac
Schwebel).
80. According to former Senator Abraham Ribicoff, who resigned from Warner's
board, the board was completely manipulated by Steve Ross. See id. at 234. "I have
never in all my life been with a board so subservient to the chairman or the chief
executive officer of any company," Ribicoff said. !d.
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William Agee, arranged substantial cash grants from the MorrisonKnudsen Foundation to his wife's pet charity, The Nurturing Network. 81
The corporation itself made substantial in-kind contributions to the pro-life
organization. 82 Furthermore, Agee spent lavishly on personal travel,
amenities and a corporate headquarters-in-exile in Carmel, California
because he did not care for the lifestyle or cultural offerings of Boise,
Idaho. 83 The company ultimately entered bankruptcy.
·
Perhaps the most audacious of the CEOs who have recognized the
value of access to corporate charitable funds was Armand Hammer of
Occidental Petroleum. The executive, who insisted on being called
"Doctor" Hammer,
used the company treasury for his philanthropic activities and to
buy works of art for the Armand Hammer Collection. Occidental
subsidized the yearly Armand Hammer Conference on Peace and
Human Rights. It financed Armand Hammer Productions, which
produced films and books about Hammer's global activities,
particularly his role as a self-appointed ambassador to establish
peaceful relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
.... Nearly a hundred million dollars of Occidental's funds had
gone into the Armand Hammer Museum of Art and Cultural
Center. 84
When Armand Hammer died, his successor immediately discontinued
most of Occidental's ongoing charitable projects. The market had clearly
recognized that Hammer's preoccupation with these activities had checked
Occidental's growth. Upon news of Hammer's death, Occidental's stock
value rose nearly $600 million overnight. 85 The era when this colorful
CEO could unilaterally direct his public company's "charitable" program
for his own self-aggrandizement had at last come to an end.
These five stories are not exceptional, except insofar as each emerged
from aggressive and effective journalistic projects; they are, rather,
81. See Diana B. Henriques, Ties That Bind: His Directors, Her Charity, N.Y.
Mar. 21, 1995, at Dl.
82. See id.
83. See Brian O'Reilly, Agee in Exile, FORTUNE, May 29, 1995, at 50.
84. Edward Jay Epstein, The Last Days of Annand Hammer, NEW YORKER, Sept.
23, 1996, at 36, 36. When an Occidental shareholder challenged the art museum
expenditures, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld them as being within the bounds of the
business judgment rule. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (declining
to upset a settlement of the case).
85. SeeSusanAntilla, WhenaC.E.O.'sPainisaGain,N.Y. TIMES, Nov.!, 1992,
at CIS.
TIMES,
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illustrative of the dark side of executives' pet charities. When powerful
chief executives, especially those with long tenure, begin to treat the
corporate coffers as their own, they are very likely to damage the
company, the integrity of its internal control mechanisms, and the sense
of fiduciary obligation that is at the center of the CEO's institutional role.
It is rare that a CEO's charitable projects are of financial significance
themselves. However, time and time again CEOs who engage in abuses
of the philanthropic function also lose control over the organizations they
head. What I propose here is that usurpation of the corporate giving
decision-making authority may be a signal of other managerial problems
that are worthy of investors' attention.
IV. WHY A CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER MAY CLAIM THE
CORPORATION'S POWER TO MAKE A CHARITABLE GIFT

Sociologist Joseph Galaskiewicz has identified five primary reasons
why corporations engage in philanthropy: (1) philanthropy stimulates
marketing; (2) philanthropy serves as a positive public relations tool; (3)
philanthropy may be motivated by "enlightened self-interest" in the sense
that serving community needs may result in long tenn loyalty by workers,
consumers and others; (4) philanthropy may provide some useful tax
benefits to the corporation; and (5) "company contributions [may] be made
to elicit the applause and approval of business peers and local
philanthropic elites. " 86 It is this last motivation-clearly a self-serving one
for upper level executives-that is the practical focus of this commentary.
According to Galaskiewicz, corporate charitable giving may be
stimulated by peer pressure brought to bear on CEOs, and by these CEOs'
logical desire to be thought of as generous by other corporate leaders:
Through the institution of peer pressure, executives learn the
expectations of their peers, are solicited: and are awarded certain
status benefits [for responding]. Giving is the nonn in many
business elite subcultures, and those who want to remain in the
inner circles had best conform and make the appropriate
contributions. 87
Galaskiewicz's evidence for this scenario is derived from his study of
corporate charitable behavior among public companies headquartered in
Minneapolis in the early 1980s. The following were among his findings:
86. Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More than

a Marketing Strategy?, in

PHILANTHROPIC GIVING: STUDIES IN VARIETIES AND GOALS

251, 252 (Richard Magat ed., 1989).
87. !d.
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(1) "companies gave more money to charity if their officers and directors
were in the networks of locally prominent business persons active in
philanthropic affairs. This effect was independent of pretax earnings,
percent of sales to consumers, [or] the birthplace of the CE0;" 88 (2)
"companies that were better integrated into the social circles of the
corporate phWmthropic elite tended to give more money to charities that
the elite either supported or used themselves;" 89 (3) "[e]xecutives' social
positions influenced the specific allocations that their companies made, as
well as the overall amount;" 90 (4) "companies that contributed more money
to charity or supported nonprofit organizations that the philanthropic elite
itself patronized were recognized by more members of the corporate
philanthropic elite as being very generous; " 91 and (5) "companies that gave
more money to charity were recognized by more members of the corporate
philanthropic elite as being very successful businesses, even controlling for
pretax earnings and performance ratios. "92
In other words, CEOs who are generally successful in increasing their
corporations' charitable contributions, and specifically successful in
directing corporate charitable contributions toward organizations whose
goals are favored among their social and business peers, are perceived by
those peers as being more successful in business, and hence more valued
colleagues, than other CEOs who are less influential in stimulating
corporate charitable gifts. In economic terms, stimulating corporate
charitable activity enhances one's value in the market for managerial labor.
Galaskiewicz's findings confirm what most observers have intuitively
suspected for years-that just as non-profit organizations exploit corporate
executives and other wealthy members of their boards of trustees, 93
corporate executives and other wealthy members of non-profit boards
exploit those organizations in turn. One example of this reciprocal
arrangement is the exchange of honorary degrees for sizeable contributions
88. ld. at 253.
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 254.
92. Id.
93. See NANCY R. LONDON, JAPANESE CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 117 (1991)
("[I]n the United States it is widely acknowledged that powerful corporate executives are
often invited to sit on the boards of eleemosynary institutions precisely because of their
connections to sources of funds-from their own corporate till and others . . . . ");
Michael Useem, Market and Institutional Factors in Corporate Contributions, 30 CAL.
MGMT. REv. 77, 86 (1988) [hereinafter Useem, Market and Institutional Factors]
("Drawing on the network of mutual influence and obligation within the highest circles
of corporate leadership may have become one of the most effective avenues for attracting
corporate suppon. ").
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to a college or university. 94 For every chief executive officer who receives
an honorary degree, one can reasonably expect to find a compensating
donation to the institution, sooner or later. Both sides benefit from this
bargain-the university receives needed funds and the CEO gains in
prestige.
Similar reciprocity exists in other non-profit areas. Non-profits
(including colleges and universities) that are persistent enough to lure an
influential CEO onto their boards can often expect some corporate support
to follow. At the same time, CEOs often accept board positions
strategically; they use their service on "mid-level" non-profit boards to
seek "promotion" to higher-status boards. 95
Galaskiewicz's conclusions might be discounted as focusing on too
localized a giving community, Minneapolis. 96 Corporate giving today has
become more decentralized than in the early 1980s and more global. 97
Nevertheless, Galask~ewicz's conclusion that corporate chief executives
may have ulterior motives for seeking to influence their company's
charitable giving practices is just as valid today as it was when his study
was conducted. CEOs still get personal gratification from making visible
contributions to the communities in which they live98 and otherwise in
implementing their philanthropic priorities. That successful executives like
John Bryan99 or Edwin Lupberger 100 can enjoy that sense of gratification,
94. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
95. See John A. Byrne, Profiting from the Nonprofits, Bus. WK., Mar. 26, 1990,
at 66.
96. Minneapolis is an especially atypical community in that the tradition of corporate
generosity has been institutionalized there for many years. CEOs in Minneapolis have
long been encouraged to belong to the "Five Percent Club," and to pledge up to five
percent of their companies' pre-tax earnings to philanthropic causes. Similar traditions
are not commonly found in other American headquarters cities.
97. See Judy B. Rosener, When Philanthropy Becomes Strategic, Something's Golla
Give, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1996, at D5 (noting movement of corporate charitable funds
from local to national and international venues).
98. Studies have shown a significant preference for donations in the city in which
the corporate headquarters is located, even where company operations are widespread.
See Useem, Market and Institutional Factors, supra note 93, at 82 ("According to one
study, companies give approximately $40 per employee to nonprofits near plant locations;
by contrast, they give $200 per employee to nonprofits near headquarters."); see also
Siegfried et al., supra note 17, at 93 (noting that when charitable giving is controlled by
the CEO or a committee of executives, the percentage of funds allocated to charities in
the headquarters city is much larger than where giving is controlled by a foundation staff
or by the board itself).
99. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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and at the same time become CEO role models, perpetuates the tradition
of opportunistic corporate giving.
V. THREE POSSffiLE REsPONSES TO OPPORTUNISTIC CORPORATE
GIVING: IGNORE IT, PROHIBIT IT, OR DISCLOSE IT

What, if anything, is to be done about the kinds of behaviors
documented in this commentary? One possibility is to do nothing.
Investors seem to tolerate the practice, 101 non-profits have benefitted from
it, and executives can fairly characterize the practice as an alternative (and
usually insignificant) form of non-cash compensation.
At first glance, maintaining the status quo appears to be an entirely
legitimate response to concerns about opportunistic corporate giving. As
a practical matter, truly egregious abuses are uncommon and the more
common forms of abuses are innocuous. Hence, one might argue, there
is no need for legal or other intervention. However, as noted below, the
current system can easily be improved. To this end, I support a minor
amendment to the current federal disclosure requirements so as to expose
to public scrutiny those corporate charitable contributions of most
immediate interest to investors. In addition, in Section VII, I urge a
rethinking of current corporate governance practices so as to focus energy
where it is most needed: On those situations in which a CEO (or other
executive) is exceeding her authority or behaving irresponsibly. Both of
these suggestions involve minimal cost and disruption to the current status

quo.
A second possible response to opportunistic corporate giving is to ban
corporate charitable contributions altogether. Many critics have argued
that corporations should not make charitable contributions102 or should
never do so absent a clearly identifiable corporate benefit. 103 One
101. This may be a function of a collective action problem. When asked to
characterize shareholder proposals related to corporate philanthropy, the SEC in recent
years has treated them as matters relating to the conduct of the Company's "ordinary
business operations" and has permitted corporations to withhold these proposals from
consideration by shareholders. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4291 (SEC). Shareholders
therefore have no practical means of objecting to opportunistic giving practices.
102. This position has most forcefully been argued by Milton Friedman. See
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 135 (1962) ("Such giving by
corporations is an inappropriate use of corporate funds in a free-enterprise society.").
103. There was a time when corporate charitable contributions were thought to be
ultra vires expenditures because they generated no benefit for the corporation. Even
where permitted, these contributions were deductible only if the corporation could
demonstrate a corresponding benefit flowing directly to the corporation. See Old Mission
Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 289, 293 (1934). The rule regarding
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commentator has suggested that, rather than condemning corporate
charitable contributions outright, we should instead treat them as ordinary
and necessary businesses expenses, but only where the conditions for such
treatment, including the receipt by the donor of some measurable quid pro
quo, are met. 104
The abolitionist position has the advantage of being relatively easy to
administer. It overlooks, however, the real social value of many "true"
corporate charitable contributions-those that cannot be disguised as a
cause-related marketing project or those that have no direct impact on
employee well-being or local good will. Prohibiting such charitable
contributions altogether would have a grievously harmful effect on many
valuable projects such as the funding of educational programs away from
the headquarters city, or the support of important but controversial
programs such as those associated with AIDS or family planning. In the
absence of any foreseeable source of replacement funds for these groups,
the abolitionist position is undesirable and, for most Americans,
indefensible.
A more limited abolitionist position-one that would permit corporate
charitable gifts generally but would prohibit certain opportunistic corporate
gifts-might provide a more palatable option. The problem with outlawing
a class of corporate gifts based on the motivations behind them, however,
is one of definition. How would opportunistic corporate gifts be
distinguished from similar, though "untainted" and therefore acceptable,
corporate gifts? 105
One possibility-a bright line rule-would prohibit charitable gifts
from a corporation where an executive officer of the corporation 106 (or
deductibility was changed with passage of the 1935 Revenue Act, which authorized
corporate charitable deductions up to five percent (now ten percent) of pre-tax earnings,
without regard to any corporate benefit. See Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407,
49 Stat. 1014.
104. See Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tat Expenditures,
the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L.
REv. I, 10, 41-42 (1994) (advocating this approach).
105. This question suggests that every corporate gift would have to fall into one or
the other category, which of course will not always be true. Many charitable gifts derive
from both a "true" philanthropic motivation and some other, more self-serving one. See
United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986) (discussing
charitable contributions that have a "dual character").
106. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-7 (1991) (defining "executive officer" to include the
president, any vice president, or any other officer who performs a policy making function
or any other person who performs similar policy making functions for the registrant).
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members of the executive's immediate family) 107 simultaneously sits on the
board of the non-profit recipient. A more encompassing alternative to this
simple "interlocking directorate" test would be to prohibit charitable gifts
from a corporation where the charitable decision-maker has a demonstrable
conflict of interest. 108
The problems with prohibitions of this sort are obvious: (1) effective
prohibition of opportunistic corporate contributions would require
legislation in all fifty states; such a campaign would be both costly, timeconsuming and unlikely of success; (2) the process of defining the
disqualifying conflicts of interest, though manageable, would consume
many lobbying and legislative resources; (3) any such prohibition would
inevitably give rise to evasive corporate behavior, including widespread
resignations of corporate executives from non-profit boards. This course
of action would do little to eliminate opportunistic corporate giving; it
would instead simply injure the non-profit recipients. Alternative
responses, such as "I'll make your contribution you make mine"
arrangements among corporate executives in different firms, would offer
little improvement over the current state of affairs.
In the end, any blanket prohibition (even of opportunistic corporate
gifts, however defined) seems both impractical and undesirable. 109
Professor Kahn's proposal-that corporate charitable gifts be disclosed in
public companies' annual filings 110-makes far more sense. Disclosure is
less likely than some form of prohibition to dry up legitimate corporate
giving. It also has the advantage of being easier to implement, given that
it would be imposed on public companies only and on a national, rather
than a state by state, basis.
The nature and detail of the required disclosure will be an important
factor in considering how the "sunshine" regime might best inhibit
opportunistic corporate giving. An easily translatable model is the
disclosure requirement now applicable to commercial conflicts of interest.
107. Cf. 17 C.F.R. 240.16a-1(e) (1991) (defining "immediate family" to include any
child, stepchild, grandchild, parent, stepparent, grandparent, spouse, sibling, mother-inlaw, father-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law, and
including adoptive relationships).
108. Cf. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.60 (1994) (defining "conflicting
interest" to include those transactions in which an executive "is so closely linked to" the
contracting party that the relationship would reasonably be expected to influence the
executive's decision as to whether to authorize the transaction).
109. Corporate law has long recognized that not all managerial conflicts of interests
are inappropriate. In the context of self-interested business transactions, both courts and
legislatures have afforded wide leeway to corporate boards to determine when a particular
transaction is desirable or undesirable.
110. See Kahn, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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Under the federal proxy rules, public companies must disclose all
commercial transactions in which a director or executive officer, or
members of their families, have a direct or indirect material interest and
in which the amount in issue is at least $60,000. 111 At a minimum, the
definition of "transaction" in this context could easily be clarified to
include corporate charitable contributions. If no other disclosures
regarding corporate giving were compelled by federal law, this change
alone would materially advance the interest of shareholders in monitoring
opportunistic gifts.
VI. A PAIR OF ADDITIONAL POSSffiLE RESPONSES:
TREAT A CORPORATION'S "PET CHARITY" CONTRIBUTIONS AS INCOME
TAXABLE TO THE CEO OR DISALLOW THE CORPORATE DEDUCTION

Both the Tax Court and the Internal' Revenue Service have taken the
position that unless a corporate charitable contribution confers some
measurable "economic benefit" on a corporate executive, it need not be
treated as a constructive dividend 112 or otherwise as compensation to the
executive. 113 A better approach might be to recognize that there is some
economic benefit that accrues to those who control corporate charitable
contributions. The value of that benefit could be taxed to them
individually.
A simple way to do this would be to treat an opportunistic corporate
charitable contribution as cash compensation to the executive, followed by
111. See 11 C.F.R. § 229.404{a) (1994) (Regulation S-K, Item 404).
112. See Knott v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 681 (1977) (explaining that where
controlling shareholders directed that a corporate gift be made to one of their favored
charities, but "did not receive property or other benefits" as a result of the gift, the
amount of the gift was deductible to the corporation and not treated as dividend income
to the shareholder); Rev. Rul. 79-9, 1979-1 C.B. 125 (acquiescing in Knott and revoking
prior rulings to the effect that a charitable contribution by a closely-held corporation will
be treated as a constructive dividend to the controlling shareholder(s) if the contribution
serves only the personal interests of the shareholder(s)).
113. Similarly, when rank-and-file employees have been called upon merely to
designate a charitable beneficiary, without receiving any personal benefit, they have not
been treated as having received gross income in the amount of the corporation's charitable
contributions in their names. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 1992 LEXIS 39877, at *26; see
also Rev. Rul. 67-137, 1967-1 C.B. 63 (stating that where employees designate a charity,
the corporation's gift paid directly to that charity will not be treated as compensation to
the employee).
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a personal charitable contribution made by her. 114 Typically, these two
payments would offset each other on the taxpayer's return but under some
circumstances (for example, where the contribution exceeds fifty percent
of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income) 115 that would not be the case. 116
There are some obvious pitfalls in this scheme-the first is the (largely
hypothetical) risk that a corporation would use this approach as a means
of circumventing the Internal Revenue Code's cap on the amount of
charitable contributions that a corporation may deduct. 117
More
significantly, the same definitional problems relating to the prohibition of
opportunistic corporate gifts described above would also apply to the
characterization of corporate gifts for purposes of individual taxation.
That is, which corporate charitable contributions would be treated as
compensation to an executive and which as "real" corporate philanthropy?
This problem might be solved as a matter of draftsmanship, but
implementation of such a scheme would be problematic. A bright-line rule
inclusive of family members' charitable activities would invade the
family's privacy at a level likely to be unacceptable to most corporate
executives. A more expansive definition of the triggering relationship
between an executive and a charity would present even greater problems.
In either case, such a definition would put lower-level corporate employees
into an extremely difficult position. They could ignore the triggering
relationship and hope the company does not get audited, or they could
114. A more radical way to treat opportunistic corporate charitable contributions
might be to attach some economic value to the "psychic" or "status" rewards enjoyed by
the corporate executive who authorizes corporate charitable contributions, and impute that
value only to her as compensation. This approach, not surprisingly, would present a
number of problems. Just how would one distinguish those benefits that would trigger
imputation (e.g., an improved position in the business leaders' network; an enhanced
likelihood that the CEO will come to the attention of executive recruiters) from those
benefits that fall short of the necessary threshold (e.g., profound satisfaction at having
helped a local art museum reach its fund-raising goal; a sense of religious fulfillment in
seeing medical supplies delivered to third world countries)? Who in the corporate
hierarchy would decide? And how would value be determined? The problems of
enforcement under this scheme would be insurmountable.
115. See I.R.C. § 170(d) (1994) (limiting an individual's charitable deduction to
50% of adjusted gross income in a single tax year).
116. There could also be a problem if the value of the contribution, taken together
with other forms of compensation, put the executive over the $1 million "cap" for
allowable executive compensation. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (1994). As Linda Sugin points
out, treating corporate contributions as individual contributions "would likely produce
some tax burden for managers." Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax
Treatment of Corporate Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 835, 871-72 (1997).
117. This risk is hypothetical because so few corporations, and virtually no publiclyheld corporations, ever get close to the 10% cap on charitable giving.
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insist that the gift be treated as compensation to the boss. Neither option
is attractive; trying to sort out the "mixed motive" cases would be even
more impossible.
Rather than treating opportunistic corporate charitable contributions as
compensation to the decision-maker, one might consider an alternative taxbased approach. A corporation could be denied a charitable deduction
where the decision-maker authorizing the contribution anticipates some
personal benefit from the gift. 118 Under current law, corporate charitable
contributions that confer incidental benefits on the corporation, its
executives, or others, do not lose their characterization as a charitable
contribution under the Internal Revenue Code. 119 An exception to this rule
could be made for opportunistic corporate contributions.
Any scheme that would deny a deduction at the corporate level for
contributions made to an executive's pet charity would generate problems
similar to those we have already explored. A bright line test might be
devised to exclude those contributions to organizations on whose board the
CEO (or her spouse) serves actively. A regulation might more broadly
attempt to define and identify "conflict of interest" contributions. 120 Either
way, the result would be wholesale resignations by corporate executives
from non-profit boards. Many opportunistic gifts would still be made; the
only difference would be a significant loss of leadership in the non-profit
sector.
In the end, using the federal income tax system as a vehicle to
discourage opportunistic corporate giving would inevitably create more
118. This treatment would be consistent with the rule that a charitable deduction is
unavailable under Section 170, where the donor expects some quid pro quo for her
contribution, even where the expected return is intangible or even spiritual. See Knauer,
supra note 104, at 36, 39 (citing Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989)
(holding that a donor may not claim a deduction under § 170 where the donee (Church
of Scientology) is expected to provide religious instruction in exchange for the gift)).
119. See Rev. Rul. 67-144, 1967-2 C.B. 119 (although retailers would receive an
incidental benefit from charitable fund's efforts to remove ugly railroad facilities from the
downtown area, their contributions to the fund were nevertheless deductible as a
charitable contribution under § 170); see also Kenneth J. Yerkes, Note, Corporate
Charitable Contributions: Expanding the Judicial Analysis in a Post-Economic Recovery
Act World, 58 IND. L.J. 161, 181-82 (1982).
As long as a corporation or other transferring business entity does not receive
a benefit commensurate with the value of the interest transferred and the
general public is sufficiently benefited, there is no statutory or policy
justification for denying a claimed charitable deduction. The state of mind or
purpose behind the corporate decision to make the transfer is not relevant to the
analysis.
!d.
120. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
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problems than it would solve. A preferable alternative would be for
boards of directors to monitor charitable giving practices-including the
identity of individual recipients and the decision-makers who have selected
them-in the same way they currently monitor other conflict-of-interest
transactions. This would put oversight of opportunistic giving where it
belongs-not in the hands of the SEC or the Internal Revenue Service but
in the hands of those representing shareholders' interests.
VII. RAISE PHILANTHROPY TO A BOARD-LEVEL AGENDA ITEM

As I have suggested elsewhere, 121 directors ought to include in their
annual agendas a systematic periodic review of corporate charitable giving
practices. Only a handful of co~orations today set aside time, or appoint
a committee, for this purpose. 1
There are several reasons why corporate philanthropy, among the
hundreds of issues that might occupy the board's attention, is worthy of
regular, board-level review. First, of course, is the inherently public
nature of philanthropy-under state law in particular, non-profit
organizations are held to high standards of public accountability and are
consequently often the subject of critical, indeed, sanctimonious, press
scrutiny. 123 Second, corporate philanthropy often implicates controversial
121. See Jayne W. Barnard, Sovereign Prerogatives, 21 J. CORP. L. 307, 319-20
(1996).
122. See KORN FERRY INTERNATIONAL, 23RD ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS
STUDY 14 (1996) (noting that only 19% of surveyed companies have a standing board
committee on corporate responsibility). Some corporations do elevate decisions relating
to charitable contributions to the board level. For example, in resisting inclusion of a
shareholder proposal regarding establishment of a scholarship fund in its 1993 proxy,
NBB Bancorp., Inc. described the oversight role of a special committee of its board as
follows:
A special committee of the Directors of the Corporation reviews the hundreds
of requests for donations that are received each year and determines which of
them meet the Corporation's established criteria. The approved requests are
funded from a donation budget, which is based upon a percentage of estimated
net income. A great amount of management and staff time is spent organizing
the material to be presented at the special committee meetings. All requests are
answered, whether approved or rejected.
NBB Bancorp Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 25, 1993, available in 1993 WL 52189.
123. See Nancy R. Axelrod, Behind the Board Room Doors: The Actions of
Nonprofit Boards Are Increasingly Likely to be Held Up to Public Scrutiny, WASH.
POST, Mar. 30, 1995, at A27 (describing the intense press coverage of problems at bluechip national charitable organizations including the United Way of America and the
NAACP).
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social issues, 124 invites criticism of the suitability of the donor, 125 and, where
executives' involvement in a charity is deep, may give rise to embarrassing
claims of management incompetence. 126 In any of these events, corporate
charitable practices may (at best) become a lightning rod for unflattering
press attention or (at worst) become items of concern to short sellers and
institutional investors.
There are other reasons why a corporation's charitable giving program
is an appropriate subject for the board's attention: (1) even moderate abuse
of the charitable prerogative may give rise to corrosive employee
disrespect for the CEO; and (2) excessive abuse of the corporate
philanthropic function may serve as a distant early warning signal of other
forms of management misconduct. 127
Still, does it make sense to require corporate directors to regularly
review the details of a corporation's giving plan? In a universe of
competing demands on directors, one must make a strong case for adding
an additional, often financially immaterial, item to the list of issues they
must regularly consider. The current wisdom is that directors should
address themselves to just five thematic issues: (1) evaluation of the CEO
and executive succession options; (2) approval of overall financial
objectives; (3) general oversight of ongoing operations; (4) board
succession; and (5) a "systems audit" function. 128
What may not be obvious from this list is the need to attend to several
other areas that inevitably give rise to executive conflicts of interest:
conflicting interest transactions themselves, 129 executive compensation
issues, and corporate opportunities as they arise. In addition, boards need
124. A widely discussed example of controversial charitable activities centers on the
abortion services provided by Planned Parenthood. Though abortion services represent
only a small portion of the organization's total budget, Planned Parenthood has become
a lightning rod for abortion opponents. One feature of the pro-life movement includes
consumer boycotts against companies that have made charitable contributions to Planned
Parenthood. See Richard Gibson, Boycott Drive Against Pioneer Hi-Bred Shows Perils
of Corporate Philanthropy, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1992, at B1 (detailing company's
decision to discontinue gifts to rural family planning clinics).
125. See Mervyn Rothstein, Uneasy Partners: Arts and Philip Morris, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1990, at C15 (examining proposals that arts organizations refuse tobacco
sponsorships).
126. See Axelrod, supra note 123 (noting criticisms of the boards of the United Way
and the NAACP for failing, in each case, to effectively monitor those organizations' chief
executives).
127. See, e.g., supra notes 61-65, 81-85.
128. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AMERICAN
COMPETITIVENESS 7 (1990).
129. See REviSED MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.60 (1994).
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to attend periodically to other, facially neutral matters such as customer
entertainment practices130 or headquarters siting decisions 131 that can give
rise to appearances of impropriety, lead to adverse media attention, and
may ultimately undermine investor confidence in management.
A. Boards Need to Monitor Those Activities
Singularly Prone to Executive Opponunism
Agency theory posits that boards of directors are uniquely situated in
public companies to monitor and control the opportunistic behavior of
incumbent management. 132 Opportunistic behavior may manifest itself with
respect to such issues as managerial compensation, perquisites, investment
in unprofitable projects and excessive use of free cash flow. 133 In light of
the personal advantages that may accrue to executives who authorize
corporate charitable contributions, opportunism may also be evident when
decisions are being made about the size of those contributions and the
identity of the recipients. 134 This is where the board of directors, and
especially outside directors, have an important moderating role to
play.l3s
A fair question to be raised at this point is whether the time devoted
to reviewing charitable activities would be repaid by information that is
useful to the board in other contexts. One of the reasons opportunistic
130. See Mark Maremont, Abuse of Power, Bus. WK., May 13, 1996, at 86
(describing the presence of prostitutes, abuse of alcohol and harassment of women
employees at Astra USA sales functions).
131. See Alan R. Myerson, Follow the Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at Dl
(describing a number of companies whose CEOs have orchestrated a relocation of the
corporate headquarters to be near to their home or favorite sporting site).
132. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual
Claims, 26 J .L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation
of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & W. H.
Meckling, Theory of the Finn: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
133. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance,
and Takeovers, 16 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
134. See Jia Wang & Betty S. Coffey, Board Composition and Corporate
Philanthropy, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 771, 773 (1992) ("Corporate philanthropy is an issue
about which principals and agents are likely to have conflicting views.").
135. Studies have shown that a company whose board is controlled by outsiders is
less likely to make charitable contributions than one whose board has a lower proportion
of outsiders. See id. at 775. Similarly, a company with a strong (more than five percent)
non-executive owner gives less to charities than a company with widely-dispersed
ownership. See Lisa Atkinson & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Stock Ownership and Company
Contributions to Charity, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 82, 93 (1988).
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giving has flourished is presumably because boards of directors have
believed that monitoring costs were excessive and that the issue of
corporate philanthropy was unworthy of their regular attention. 136 Another
reason, unfortunately, may be that outside directors have often been co"
opted in the guise of corporate philanthropy and may have their own
conflicts of interest. Donations in their names to special charities are a
common perquisite of board service. 137 The rise of "charitable awards
programs," in which corporations purchase substantial life insurance
policies on the lives of their directors, payable to the director's chosen
charity upon death, 138 makes it all the more uncomfortable for directors to
challenge other forms of philanthropoid behavior, and all the more
unlikely they will do so.
In many cases, I must concede, an exacting review of a company's
charitable giving activities will not reveal any information that is likely to
be transportable to the overall assessment of management's performance.
Excesses in philanthropy are seldom as useful an indicator of managerial
profligacy as are, say, the purchase of a fleet of corporate vanity jets or
the existence of low interest loans to insiders. 139 Nevertheless, a board
level review of corporate philanthropy may have a positive spillover effect:
just as bank regulators have found that some managerial behaviors are
more effective signals of future bank failures than others, 140 investigators
with decent data would likely conclude that opportunistic corporate
philanthropy is a more effective signal of future corporate distress than
many other executive behaviors. I cannot prove this relationship, but
reason and real world observation suggests that often, opportunistic
corporate giving is but one of many symptoms of what some have called
"CEO disease, " 141 and what all have observed as the perilous situation
when a CEO becomes unable to distinguish between his own priorities and
those of the corporation he heads. Time after time, this loss of boundaries
136. See James R. Boatsman & Sanjay Gupta, Tates and Corporate Charity:
Empirical Evidence from Micro-level Panel Data, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 193, 209 (1996).
137. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
138. See Dana Wechsler Linden & Robert Lenzner, The Cosseted Director, FORBES,
May 22, 1995, at 168 (describing such programs). Typically the policies are for $1
million. One financial advisory firm says it is now doing new charity plans for directors
at the rate of one every two weeks. See id.
139. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every
Business Now a Bank?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 237 (1988).
140. See John P. Forde, Study Shows Insider Loans May Signal Failure- Research
Finds Many Loans to Bank Officials Portend Trouble, AM. BANKER, July 9, 1987, at 3
(describing study suggesting that one-third of bank failures involve insider lending abuse).
141. John A. Byrne, CEO Disease, Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 1991, at 52.
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and the sense that "I am the company and the company is me" is a chilling
precursor of later corporate ruin.
B. The Need for a Corporate Giving Policy that Clearly

Articulates the Corporation •s Objectives
A board of directors can oversee corporate giving without
micromanaging it. The steps involved in this process are simple: (1)
ascertain that there is a rational giving plan in place; (2) confirm that the
plan is being followed; and (3) ensure that the CEO is not interfering with,
or substituting her judgment for, the plan that has been established and
approved by the board. Using this approach, the board might also give
the CEO some discretionary funds earmarked for use in rewarding her
"pet charities." These funds, however, would be considered as part of the
CEO's overall compensation package. 142
There are a number of specific ways in which corporate boards might
oversee the charitable giving program. One way to approach this task
might be to require that corporate giving executives articulate a medium
to long-term "philanthropic contributions plan" in the same way, and with
the same degree of specificity, that individual business units do. At a

minimum, boards ought to insist that management develop guidelines for
charitable giving that are as subject to internal audit as all other corporate
policies. A more exacting approach would be to require management to
identify and quantify the specific benefit(s) which they predict will accrue
from the corporation's anticipated charitable contributions, and then weigh
the results against those predictions, as part of the overall management
assessment.
Regardless of the board's approach, however, a company's directors
should be aware of the corporation's charitable objectives and have some
means of measuring how well the company is meeting its charitable goals.
More importantly, the board should have a strong sense of the role that the
CEO is playing in setting the giving strategy and determining the identity
of charitable recipients.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Whether one approaches the issue of corporate philanthropy from a
traditional or a conununitarian perspective, the current state of the law and
practice of corporate philanthropy is unsettling. As a practical matter,
corporate charitable gifts may be made without any regard to their impact
on shareholder wealth, thus calling into question traditional corporate law
142. How these funds would be treated for tax purposes would be a separate issue,
presumably not within the purview of the board.
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norms; 143 at the same time, corporate charitable gifts need not be animated
by any real corporate commitment to social betterment or shared
community values, thus undermining and trivializing emerging
communitarian theories about the essentially public nature of the
corporation. 144
One need not commit, moreover, to either the traditional or the
communitarian view of the corporation to recognize that a regime that
permits unfettered CEO interference in corporate philanthropic activities
is not a healthy one for the long-term integrity of the corporation.
Permitting corporate executives to impose their personal values or status
aspirations on the process of corporate giving is inconsistent with sound
corporate governance practices and may ultimately be harmful to investors.
In this commentary, I have proposed that corporate boards of directors
become more involved in, or at least more aware of, the philanthropic
activities of the companies on whose boards they sit. This proposal does
not require legislative enactment, the imprimatur of the American Law
Institute, or even the wake-up call of a Delaware Supreme Court
decision. 145 It does require a determination by individual directors that
there is a limit to the degree to which they should indulge the company's
top executives; that charitable expenditures, like other expenditures that
may be colored by self-interest, are an essential subject for the board's
attention; and that-whether or not self-interest is found-oversight of the
corporate charitable function is a valuable use of their limited time.

143. As one commentator has pointed out, under existing law, virtually "any gift"
to a bona fide charity can withstand the claims of shareholders that it represented
corporate waste. See Shelby D. Green, Corporate Philanthropy and the Business Benefit:
The Need for Clarity, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 239, 254 {1990).
144. See generally, Lawrence E. Mitchell, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW xiii
(1995) ("It is time that the corporation be recognized as what it is: a public institution
with public obligations.").
145. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (announcing new
standards for boards of directors when approached with an acquisition offer).

